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RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES-AccOMMODATION ACCEPTOR. In an action to recover the
amounts of four trade acceptances from the drawer-payee who indorsed
them in blank to the plaintiff's assignor, the defendant contended that he
was entitled to notice of presentment and dishonor as required in REM.
REV. STAT. § 3479. The evidence failed to reveal any presentment or notice
of dishonor to the defendant. Plaintiff alleged that he was an accommoda-
tion acceptor thereby coming under an exception to the above require-
ment as stated in REM. REV. STAT. § 3505: "Notice of dishonor is not re-
quired to be given to an indorser . . . where the instrument was made
or accepted for his accommodation." Held: The defendant was entitled to
notice. The plaintiff did not come within this exception. The word "ac-
cepted" did not refer to the receiving by a holder, but to the acceptance
of a bill of exchange by the drawee. Legal Discount Corp. v. Martin
Hardware Co., 199 Wash. 476, 91 P. (2d) 1010 (1939).
The general rule of construction under the Negotiable Instruments Law
is that "acceptance" means the signification by the drawee of his assent
to the order of the drawer on a bill of exchange. Lucas v. Swan, 67 F.
(2d) 106 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933), 90 A. L. R. 218 (1934). "Accommodation"
is the lending of credit, by the use of the lender's name on the instru-
ment, to the person primarily liable. First Nat. Bank v. Bach, 98 Ore.
332, 193 Pac. 1041 (1920).
Prior to this decision, the Washington law was unsettled because of
two conflicting holdings on this point. In Fosdick v. Government Mineral
Springs Hotel, 115 Wash. 127, 196 Pac. 652 (1921), which is specifically
overruled by the instant case, it was held that a bank which discounted
a note for an insolvent maker in lieu of suing on a former note was an
"accommodation acceptor" as to the indorsers, who were the same on both
notes, and therefore they were not entitled to notice of dishonor. It is
apparent that the court misinterpreted the words "acceptance" and "accom-
modation" by giving them a literal construction. This case has been criti-
cized in Lucas v. Swan, supra, and in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW (6th ed. 1938) § 115.
Clausen v. Forehand, 152 Wash. 310, 277 Pac. 827 (1929), ruled in accord
with the recent holding without mentioning the Fosdick case. The sub-
stantiation of the Clausen case brings this state into line with the weight
of authority. Liberty Bank & Trust Co. v. Hand, 269 Ky. 342, 107 S. W.
(2d) 285 (1937); Nolan v. Brown, 152 La. 333, 93 So. 113 (1922); First Nat.
Bank v. Bach, supra; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Ashley Corp., 133 S. C. 304,
130 S. E. 890 (1925); 8 Am. Jur. 342.
It is worthwhile to note that the correlative duty of presentment must
be fulfilled before the indorser's liability can be established, unless it was
shown that failure to present for payment was excused on the grounds
that the indorser had no reason to expect that the instrument would be
paid if presented. REM. REV. STAT. § 3471.
S. J. K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CITIZENSHIP-DUAL ALLEGIANCE-RIGHT OF ELEC-
TION. Plaintiff, born in the United States of naturalized Swedish parents,
assumed residence in Sweden during her minority due to her parents'
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return and resumption of citizenship there. At majority she applied suc-
cessfully as a United States citizen for an American passport, returned
to the United States, and established permanent residence. The Depart-
ment of Labor now orders her deportation as an alien. Both the district
court and circuit court of appeals found her a United States citizen. On
writ of certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed the decree. Perkins v. Elg,
59 Sup. Ct. 884 (1939).
Dual citizenship of persons arises because most nations define citizen-
ship by both jus soli (nationality by place of birth) and jus sanguinis
(nationality by blood), 1 HYDE, INTERNATIoNAL LAw (1922) § 372. The
United States has adopted jus soli as a part of its basic law: "All persons
born ... in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States." U. S. CONST., Art. XIV, § 1 (1868). By
statute it has adopted jus sanguinis: "All children born out of the limits
and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers may be at the time
of their birth citizens of the United States, are declared to be citizens
of the United States .. ." 48 STAT. 797 (1934), 8 U. S. C. § 6 (1934).
Every United States citizen has the right of expatriation. REv. STAT.
§ 1999 (1878), 8 U. S. C. § 15 (1934). Expatriation is "The voluntary act
of abandoning one's country and becoming the citizen or subject of an-
other." BALDvnN, BouviEa's LAw DIcTIoNARY (Stud. Ed. 1928) 388. But
Congress exercises the power to define what acts shall expatriate a citizen.
United States ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth, 14 F. Supp. 770 (W. D. N. Y. 1936).
Naturalization by another nation expatriates an adult. 34 STAT. 1229 (1907),
8 U. S. C. § 17 (1934). Pledging allegiance to another government expatri-
ates an adult. United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth, 19 F. Supp. 581
(W. D. N. Y. 1937). Formal renunciation upon marriage to an alien de-
stroys the, citizenship of a woman. 46 STAT. 1511 (1931), 8 U. S. C. § 9
(1934). And avoidance of the draft or desertion in time of war forfeits
one's citizenship. 37 STAT. 356 (1912), 8 U. S. C. § 11 (1934). Each of these
methods of losing American citizenship involves a voluntary act of the
citizen. It has been suggested that no act of legislation can destroy one's
native American citizenship without his concurrence. Mackenzie v. Hare,
239 U. S. 299 (1915).
However, whether a minor lost his American citizenship of nativity
by reason of his parents' expatriation had not been settled prior to the
instant case. Several opinions in the last decade supported the view that
citizenship was lost. Ostby v. Salmon, 177 Minn. 289, 225 N. W. 158 (1929);
Koppe v. Pfefferle, 188 Minn. 619,'248 N. W. 41 (1933). These decisions
argued that the text of Section two of the Act of March 2, 1907 (34 STAT.
1229 (1907), 8 U. S. C. § 17 (1934), reading "Any American citizen shall
be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in
any foreign state in conformity with its laws . . .", applied equally to a
minor though his naturalization was derivative through his parents. In
1932 Attorney General William D. Mitchell rendered a departmental opin-
ion wherein this interpretation was adopted. 36 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 535
(1932). These three opinions influenced the decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in United States v. Reid, 73 F. (2d) 153
(C. C. A. 9th, 1934), which further argued that Congress in this statute
intended to reach the same result as that reached under the British act
(33 & 34 Vict., c. 14, § 10 (1870)) which provided that the minor child lost
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his British citizenship when his parents' expatriation conferred upon him
a new citizenship.
The contrary view held that no act of a parent, subsequent to the child's
birth within the United States, could have the effect of depriving him of
his American citizenship. State ex rel. Phelps v. Jackson, 79 Vt. 504, 65
Atl. 657, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1245 (1907); Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356
(1863) 84 Am. Dec. 210 (1887). Previous to 1932, opinions of both the State
Department and Attorney General Department reached the same conclu-
sion. FoR. REL. (1885) 171; 15 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 15 (1880); 3 MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) § 430. This view seems to be better for it
recognizes that the assumption of another citizenship by an adult is volun-
tary while that of a minor is necessarily involuntary. Hence it would
seem proper to construe statutes and treaties in such a way as to preserve
an election for the minor, as was done in the instant case.
The minor, within a reasonable time after attaining majority, must
exercise the right of election by affirming his United States citizenship
and refusing allegiance to all other nations. Continued residence in the
foreign jurisdiction after majority often establishes a conclusive presump-
tion of the election of foreign citizenship. FOR. REL. (1903) 595. Acts speak
more forcefully than words: ". . . If they decided to retain their American
citizenship, 'the best evidence of this fact would be their return to the
United States to remain and discharge their obligations and duties as
such'." 3 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) 542.
A. S. Q.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-WHEN ANOTHER REMEDY Is AVAILABLE. Action
by the lessor against the lessee for a declaratory judgment that the lease
was invalid or to cancel the same. Held: Plaintiff is entitled to a declara-
tory judgment as to the validity of the lease, but "a declaration will not
be made as to the rights of parties to a contract, where it appears that
the controversy relates to acts which have already been committed and
for the redress of which there exists an action at law". People's Park
and Amusement Ass'n, Inc. v. Anrooney, 100 Wash. Dec. 43, 93 P. (2d) 362
(1939).
This action was brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act, REM. REV. STAT. §H 784-1 to 784-17. The pertinent sections here are
the first two. Section 784-1 gives to courts of record the power to declare
rights, status, or other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed. Section 784-2 states that a person interested under a
contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
contract may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the contract and may obtain a declaration of rights, status,
or other legal relations thereunder.
By § 784-2 the plaintiff in this case is entitled to a declaratory judgment,
and the court so held but limited his right to the determination of the
validity of the contract. The plaintiff was denied the right to maintain an
action to establish his right to cancel the lease since he had "a full and com-
plete remedy in an action in unlawful detainer". In taking this view the
Washington court held that the Act was not designed to be an alternative
remedy when another established remedy existed. The courts of many other
states have come to this same conclusion. Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19,
242 N. W. 823 (1932); Lisbon Village District v. Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 155
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A. 252 (1931); Nesbitt v. Manufacturere" Cas. Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165
At. 403 (1933); Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii 420 (1923). See also 9 Uniform
Laws Annotated 123 (1932) and Supplement (1938) p. 55; Notes (1930)
68 A. L. R. 119, (1933) 87 A. L. IL 1219; 16 Am. Jur. 287.
There is another line of authority which holds that the declaratory
judgments acts were designed specifically to provide alternative remedies
to those in existence- when the act went into effect. Tuscaloosa County v.
Shamblin, 233 Ala. 6, 169 So. 234 (1936); Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co.,
272 N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. (2d) 829 (1936). The argument for this position is a
strong one based primarily on the language of the first section of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act which states that courts may give
the declaration whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The
language is clear and evidently means that the declaration may be given
whether another remedy (1) is also claimed, (2) could be claimed but
is not claimed, or (3) could not be claimed. Furthermore, declaratory
judgments were designed to allow an alternative remedy and were uni-
formly so construed until the Supreme Court of Hawaii handed down an
adverse decision in the case of Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii 420 (1923);
see BOacHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGIINTS (1934) pp. 147-162. In Professor
Borchard's most recent article on the subject he points out: "An error
which still persists in isolated quarters is the assumption of a few courts
. . . that when another remedy is available, the declaratory judgment
may not be invoked." Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 1939 (1939) 9
BRooKLYN L. REv. 5.
The view championed by Professor Borchard would tend, in cases like
the instant one, to avoid a multiplicity of suits. In the instant case our
court could have given a declaration of the rights of the parties at the
same time it gave a declaration as to the validity of the contract since
both parties were already before the court. The judgment given forces
them to have a new trial. It must be admitted that there is abundant
authority from the courts of other states for the construction here adopted
by the Washington court. But in view of the very clear language of the
legislative mandate, and in view of the policy which the Act was meant
to subserve, it is submitted that the Act should be construed to provide
an alternative remedy.
J. M. D.
EVIDENCE-RES GESTAE STATEMENTS BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDERS-NECES-
SITY OF OasERVATIOzi. The plaintiff, while attempting to cross a downtown
street at an intersection, was struck by the defendant's automobile. The
plaintiff offered in evidence the exclamation of an unidentified bystander
made soon after the accident to the effect that the defendant had driven
through a red light. The court set forth the following six requirements
as tests for the admissibility of a res gestae statement: 1. The statement
must relate to the main event and must explain or elucidate it. 2. It must
not be a mere narrative of a past event. 3. It must be a statement of fact
and not opinion. 4. It must be a spontaneous or instinctive utterance. 5. It
must be made at such time and under such circumstances as will exclude
the presumption of deliberation. 6. It must be made by a participant in
the transaction or by ohe who witnessed the incident about which the
declaration was made. Held: Here although the declaration satisfied the
1940]
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first five requirements, it was excluded because there was no showing
that the declarant actually observed the accident. Beck v. Dye, 100 Wash.
Dec. 1, 92 P. (2d) 1113 (1939).
The majority rule regarding res gestae statements of bystanders admits
the declarations in evidence subject to the requirements normally applied
to such statements when made by a participant in the transaction, with
the additional qualification of showing that the declarant observed the
event. The difficulty arises, however, in determining the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the fact of observation.
Two contrasting lines of authority have developed in those jurisdic-
tions which admit statements of unidentified bystanders. One group of
cases apparently agrees with the instant case and makes the admissibility
of statements by non-participants depend upon direct proof of an oppor-
tunity to observe. Hines v. Patterson, 146 Ark. 367, 225 S. W. 642 (1920);
Gose, Adm'x v. True, 197 Iowa 1094, 198 N. W. 528 (1924); Rooker v. Deering
S. W. Ry. Co., 215 Mo. App. 481, 247 S. W. 1016 (1923); Hambright v. Atlanta
& C. Air Line.Ry. Co., 102 S. C. 166, 86 S. E. 375 (1915). In other juris-
dictions the requirement has been less rigorously applied, and in those
cases the courts have been willing to infer the fact of actual observation
either from incomplete testimony tending to show the opportunity of
the bystander to view the accident, N. Y., Chicago & St. Louis R. R. Co.
v. Kovatch, 120 Ohio 532, 166 N. E. 682 (1929), or merely from the facts
that the declarant was present immediately after the occurrence of the
event and that he made a spontaneous declaration about it. Standard Oil
Co. v. Johnson, 299 Fed. 93 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924); Armborst v. Cincinnati
Traction Co., 25 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); York v. Charles, 132 S. C.
230, 128 S. E. 29 (1925); Johnson v. St. Paul & W. Coal Co., 126 Wis. 492,
105 N. W. 1048 (1906).
The instant case is apparently the first Washington case directly to
raise the question of observation; but there are numerous cases discussing
the admissibility of res gestae statements of non-participants. The fol-
lowing cases allowed the use of the particular statement involved: Britton
v. Wash. Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 Pac. 20 (1910) (declarant a
passenger of a street car); Heg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 Pac. 51 (1921).
and Duvall v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 191 Wash. 417, 71 P. (2d) 567
(1937) (declarants passengers in automobiles); Roberts v. Port Blakely
Mill Co., 30 Wash. 25, 70 Pac. 111 (1902); Lambert v. La Conner Trading
& Transportation Co., 30 Wash. 346, 70 Pac. 960 (1902); Swanson v. Pacific
Shipping Co., 60 Wash. 87, 110 Pac. 795 (1910) (the declarants in each of
the three cases, servants, agents, employees etc.). Cases which exclude
res gestae statements for failure to.fulfill some particular requirement are:
Dixon v. Northrn Pacific R. Co., 37 Wash. 310, 79 Pac. 943 (1905); Henry v.
Seattle Electric Co., 55 Wash. 444, 104 Pac. 776 (1909); Barnett v. Bull, 141
Wash. 139, 250 Pac. 955 (1926); Field v. North Coast Transportation Co., 164
Wash. 123, 2 P. (2d) 672 (1931); Spokane County v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co., 178 Wash. 389, 35 P. (2d) 1 (1934). The failure to discuss this re-
quirement in the past may be explained on the ground that in the normal
case the requirement of observation will not become an issue in itself
since the other facts will sufficiently suggest that the bystander has wit-
nessed the event to which his statement relates. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1930) § 1751.
[VOL. 15
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The court in the instant case divided upon the issue as to whether or
not the presence of the unidentified person soon after the accident and
his spontaneous declaration were in themselves sufficient proof that the
declarant had observed the event. The dissenting opinion indicates that in
this, as well as in past cases, the fulfillment of all the other requirements
makes it more reasonable than not to infer that the bystander actually
saw the car go through the red light; while the majority opinion stresses
the lack of proof as to the actual fact of observation. Whether a valid
distinction for requiring further proof of observation can be found on
the basis that the statement was in the past tense rather than in the
present tens6, or on the ground that the bystander was in a constantly
shifting group rather than in a definitely constituted one, as for example,
passengers in a car, bus or street car, or workers on the deck of a ship, are
are questions which will have to be determined by future cases.
Although it is true that a res gestae statement may be used when the
declarant is known or is in court, such statements become of particular
value when the declarant is an unidentified bystander who is unavailable
as a witness. Thus, although a desirable result may have been reached in
the instant case, the strict application of the requirement of observation
as indicated by this decision may mean that spontaneous exclamations of
such non-participants will not in the future be admitted except upon actual
proof of their observations-as perhaps by another witness. If this is the
result, the use of res gestae statements of unidentified bystanders-valu-
able testimony otherwise inaccessible-may be effectually destroyed:
N. B. F.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES HELD IN TRUST-JURIs-
DICTION TO TAX-MuLTI-STATE TAXATION. An- Alabama trustee held certain
stocks and bonds for a beneficiary domiciled in Tennessee, who had the
power to dispose of the property by will. This she did. Both Alabama
and Tennessee sought to levy inheritance taxes upon the transfer. Held:
The states of Alabama and Tennessee each constitutionally may impose
death taxes upon the transfer of an 'interest in the intangibles held in
trust. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939). Accord: Graves v. El-
liott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939).
The wealth of this country being represented to so great an extent by
intangibles the problem of double taxation in situations similar to that
involved in the above cases is acute. As to tangibles the law is more
certain, the state of the decedent's domicile being able to exact a transfer
tax on the succession to only those tangibles located permanently in the
state. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) (tax by Pennsylvania
upon transfer of tangible personalty having actual situs in other states
contravenes due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Until
1930 it seemed that intangible property, unlike tangible property, might
be subjected to a death transfer tax in more than one state. Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903) (deposit in a New York trust company to the
credit of the decedent domiciled in Illinois, subject to transfer tax imposed
by New York notwithstanding similar tax imposed by Illinois).
This was thought to be the law until a series of four cases was handed
down by the court, the first of which expressly overruled Blackstone v.
Miller, supra. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930)
(testamentary transfer by decedent domiciled in New York of bonds issued
19401
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by Minnesota not taxable in Minnesota); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586 (1930) (credits consisting of deposits in Missouri banks, United States
bonds and promissory notes located within the state passing under the
will of a testator domiciled in Illinois not taxable in Missouri); Beidler v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1 (1930) (transfer of the Illinois
testator's stock in and indebtedness owed by a South Carolina corporation
not taxable in South Carolina); First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S.
312 (1932) (transfer of shares of stock in a Maine corporation left by
decedent domiciled in Massachusetts not taxable in Maine). The broadest
implication of these cases is that the due process clause prevents multi-
state taxation of intangibles to the same extent it prevents multi-state
taxation of tangibles. The narrowest implication is that the due process
clause prevents a state other than that of the domicile from imposing a
tax upon the intangibles of the decedent in the specific foregoing cases.
Rottschaefer, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles (1931) 15 MINN.
L. REV. 741. The rather broad language of these 1930-1932 cases might be
taken to indicate that the law regarding taxation of intangibles is to be
settled in favor of single taxation by attributing to intangibles a situs.
But equally broad language in Curry v. McCanless, supra, indicates that
the narrowest premise may be the proper one and that the protection of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to those
specific cases heretofore decided.
Relief from double taxation in similar circumstances, under this view,
is to be had by action on part of the states. As pointed *out in the Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. case many states have reciprocal exemption provisions
in their inheritance tax statutes. Washington had such a provision (Wash.
Laws 1929, c. 202, § 1; Wash. Laws 1931, c. 134, § 10), under which in-
tangibles of residents of another state were not subject to inheritance
taxes where such state did not tax intangibles of residents of this state.
In re Eilermann's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P. (2d) 763 (1934). This section
was specifically repealed by Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, § 125.
Shortly after the decisions in the Curry and Elliot cases the Tax Com-
mission of the State of Washington ruled that ". . . except as to intangibles
held by a resident trustee under a trust agreement", it will "collect an
inheritance tax upon intangibles only in case the decedent was a resident
of this state at the time of death". Tax Commission ruling, September 25,
1939. It is therefore possible that non-resident owners of intangibles
located in Washington may escape double taxation, except in the trust
cases, while residents of Washington with intangibles located in sister
states may be subjected to inheritance taxes in both states, unless the
Tax Commission ruling be accepted by the sister state as of equal force
to a reciprocal exemption provisidn in an inheritance tax enactment. It
would seem desirable that a specific reciprocal provision should be passed
by the legislature.
For further discussion of the problem see: Euwer, The Supreme Court
of the United States: Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles (1939) 28 GEo. L. J.
69; Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain, But What of Domi-
cile? (1939) 53 HARv. L. REv. 68; Notes (1939) U. OF PA. L. REV. 120, (1939)
5 U. OF PrrTSBURGH L. REV. 295; and viewing the cases as relating to a dif-
ferent problem, Cherry, The Taxation of Trust Intangibles (1939) 27
CALIF. L. REV. 674.
H. A. B.
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